中国邮电高校学报(英文) ›› 2007, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (1): 61-64.doi: 1005-8885 (2007) 01-0061-04

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Factors for wireless operators’ collusion and competition

WEN Dan-hui, CHEN Rong-bang, LU Ting-jie   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University,
    Beijing 100084, China
  • 收稿日期:2006-06-30 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2007-03-30
  • 通讯作者: WEN Dan-hui

Factors for wireless operators’ collusion and competition

WEN Dan-hui, CHEN Rong-bang, LU Ting-jie   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University,
    Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2006-06-30 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2007-03-30
  • Contact: WEN Dan-hui

摘要:

This article analyses on why China Mobile and China Unicom have chosen price war rather than tacit collusion these years. On the basis of the analysis on factors that influence tacit collusion, and combined with the facts of wireless communication market, the author suggests that the market asymmetries, cost asymmetries, and product differentiation are the basic factors, which trigger price competition between the Chinese wireless operators. By constructing a game model based on Churn rate, this article discusses how these factors cause a fight between the operators and how vigorous the price competition will be. At last, the author suggests that to keep vigor in this industry, continuous structural adjustment is essential. Besides, the number portability policies may cause tacit collusion.

关键词:

churn;rate,;wireless;communication,;collusion,;market;asymmetries,;cost;asymmetries,;product;differentiation

Abstract:

This article analyses on why China Mobile and China Unicom have chosen price war rather than tacit collusion these years. On the basis of the analysis on factors that influence tacit collusion, and combined with the facts of wireless communication market, the author suggests that the market asymmetries, cost asymmetries, and product differentiation are the basic factors, which trigger price competition between the Chinese wireless operators. By constructing a game model based on Churn rate, this article discusses how these factors cause a fight between the operators and how vigorous the price competition will be. At last, the author suggests that to keep vigor in this industry, continuous structural adjustment is essential. Besides, the number portability policies may cause tacit collusion.

Key words:

churn rate;wireless communication;collusion;market asymmetries;cost asymmetries;product differentiation

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