Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters) ›› 2012, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (4): 94-105.doi: 10.1016/S1005-8885(11)60288-4

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Improved certificateless multi-proxy signature

XU Jie,SUN Hong-xiang,WEN Qiao-yan,ZHANG Hua   

  1. School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China 2. State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:2011-11-15 Revised:2012-03-20 Online:2012-08-31 Published:2012-09-12
  • Supported by:

    This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61170270, 61100203, 60903152, 61003286, 61121061), and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (BUPT2011YB01, BUPT2011RC0505, 2011PTB-00-29, 2011RCZJ15, 2012RC0612).


Multi-proxy signature is a scheme that an original signer delegates his or her signing capability to a proxy group. In the scheme, only the cooperation of all proxy signers in the proxy group can create a signature on behalf of the original signer. Jin and Wen firstly defined the formal security model of certificateless multi-proxy signature (CLMPS) and proposed a concrete CLMPS scheme. However, their construction has three problems: the definition of the strengthened security model is inaccurate, the concrete signature scheme has a security flaw, and the proof of the security is imperfect. With further consideration, a remedial strengthened security model is redefined, and an improved scheme is also proposed, which is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-warrant, chosen-message and chosen-identity attacks in the random oracles. In this condition, the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption is used to prove full security for our CLMPS scheme.

Key words:

certificateless, multi-proxy signature, provable security, bilinear map