Extensive game analysis and improvement strategy of DPOS consensus mechanism

doi:10.19682/j.cnki.1005-8885.2021.0030

中国邮电高校学报(英文) ›› 2021, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 27-35.doi: 10.19682/j.cnki.1005-8885.2021.0030

所属专题： Special issue on Blockchain Technology and Applications

• Blockchain • 上一篇下一篇

Extensive game analysis and improvement strategy of DPOS consensus mechanism

王雷¹,朱庆华¹,李保珍²

1. 南京大学
2. 南京审计大学

收稿日期:2021-06-30 修回日期:2021-11-08 出版日期:2021-10-31 发布日期:2021-10-29
通讯作者: 李保珍 E-mail:bzli@nau.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金;国家自然科学基金;江苏省社科基金;教育部-中国移动科研基金

Extensive game analysis and improvement strategy of DPOS consensus mechanism

Received:2021-06-30 Revised:2021-11-08 Online:2021-10-31 Published:2021-10-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

Delegated proof-of-stake ( DPOS) consensus mechanism is widely adopted in blockchain platforms, but problems exist in its current applications. In order to explore the security risks in the voting attack of the DPOS consensus mechanism, an extensive game model between nodes was constructed, and it was concluded that the DPOS consensus mechanism relies too much on tokens, and the possibility of node attacks is very high. In order to solve the problems of frequent changes of DPOS consensus mechanism nodes, inactive node voting, excessive reliance on tokens, and malicious nodes, a dynamic, credible, and attack-evading DPOS consensus mechanism was proposed. In addition, the Python simulation results show that the improved Bayesian voting algorithm is effective in calculating node scores.

关键词:

blockchain, delegated proof-of-stake ( DPOS) consensus mechanism, extensive game, Bayesian voting algorithm, the objectivity of voting

Abstract:

Key words:

blockchain, delegated proof-of-stake ( DPOS) consensus mechanism, extensive game, Bayesian voting algorithm, the objectivity of voting

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Extensive game analysis and improvement strategy of DPOS consensus mechanism

Extensive game analysis and improvement strategy of DPOS consensus mechanism

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