Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters) ›› 2010, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (5): 12-19.doi: 10.1016/S1005-8885(09)60501-X

• Wireless • 上一篇    下一篇

Novel pricing model for spectrum leasing in secondary spectrum market

王雷,贺志强,林家儒,徐兴坤,许文俊   

  1. 北京邮电大学
  • 收稿日期:2010-01-08 修回日期:2010-05-10 出版日期:2010-10-30 发布日期:2010-10-31
  • 通讯作者: 王雷 E-mail:raywonder@gmail.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家“973计划”项目(2009CB320401);国家自然科学基金(60772108);中央高校基本科研业务费资助(BUPT2009RC0111);其他

Novel pricing model for spectrum leasing in secondary spectrum market

  1. Key Laboratory of Universal Wireless Communications, Ministry of Education, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:2010-01-08 Revised:2010-05-10 Online:2010-10-30 Published:2010-10-31

摘要:

According to the property rights model of cognitive radio, primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, an implementation of this framework is investigated, where a primary link can lease the owned spectrum to secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation (relaying). A novel pricing model is proposed that enables the trading between spectrum and cooperation. Based on the demand of secondary nodes, the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service (QoS) by setting the price of spectrum. Taking the price asked by primary link, the secondary nodes aim to obtain most profits by deciding the amount of spectrum to buy and then pay for it by cooperative transmission. The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of seller/buyer (Stackelberg) games. Analysis and numerical results show that our pricing model is effective and practical for spectrum leasing based on trading spectral resource for cooperation.

关键词:

cognitive radio, property rights, cooperative transmission, spectrum leasing, secondary spectrum market

Abstract:

According to the property rights model of cognitive radio, primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, an implementation of this framework is investigated, where a primary link can lease the owned spectrum to secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation (relaying). A novel pricing model is proposed that enables the trading between spectrum and cooperation. Based on the demand of secondary nodes, the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service (QoS) by setting the price of spectrum. Taking the price asked by primary link, the secondary nodes aim to obtain most profits by deciding the amount of spectrum to buy and then pay for it by cooperative transmission. The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of seller/buyer (Stackelberg) games. Analysis and numerical results show that our pricing model is effective and practical for spectrum leasing based on trading spectral resource for cooperation.

Key words:

cognitive radio, property rights, cooperative transmission, spectrum leasing, secondary spectrum market