中国邮电高校学报(英文)

中国邮电高校学报(英文) ›› 2019, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (3): 73-80.doi: 10.19682/j.cnki.1005-8885.2019.0017

• Artificial Intelligence • 上一篇    下一篇

Cryptanalysis on “an arbitrated quantum signature protocol based on the chained CNOT operations encryption”

闻楷1,郑世慧1,孙斌2   

  1. 1. 北京邮电大学
    2. 北京邮电大学计算机学院
  • 收稿日期:2018-09-12 修回日期:2019-04-11 出版日期:2019-06-30 发布日期:2019-06-30
  • 通讯作者: 郑世慧 E-mail:shihuizh@bupt.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金;国家科技重大专项

Cryptanalysis on “an arbitrated quantum signature protocol based on the chained CNOT operations encryption”

  • Received:2018-09-12 Revised:2019-04-11 Online:2019-06-30 Published:2019-06-30

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摘要： Arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) is an important branch in quantum cryptography to authenticate quantum information, and cryptanalysis on AQS protocols helps to evaluate and improve security of AQS. Recently, it is discovered that an AQS protocol base on chained controlled-NOT (CNOT) algorithm is vulnerable to a novel attack because a transformation from binary keys into permutations and the chained CNOT algorithm have special properties, which enables a malicious receiver to forge signatures with probability 1/2. Moreover, a malicious signer can also deny his signatures with probability 1/4. Then, two possible improved methods are presented to resist these attacks: one is padding constants to reduce probability of the successful attacks, and the other is a circular chained CNOT algorithm to make the attack strategy invalid. And the security analysis shows that both the two improve methods could well resist these attacks.

关键词: arbitrated quantum signature, chained CNOT, forgery, disavowal

Abstract: Arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) is an important branch in quantum cryptography to authenticate quantum information, and cryptanalysis on AQS protocols helps to evaluate and improve security of AQS. Recently, it is discovered that an AQS protocol base on chained controlled-NOT (CNOT) algorithm is vulnerable to a novel attack because a transformation from binary keys into permutations and the chained CNOT algorithm have special properties, which enables a malicious receiver to forge signatures with probability 1/2. Moreover, a malicious signer can also deny his signatures with probability 1/4. Then, two possible improved methods are presented to resist these attacks: one is padding constants to reduce probability of the successful attacks, and the other is a circular chained CNOT algorithm to make the attack strategy invalid. And the security analysis shows that both the two improve methods could well resist these attacks.

Key words: arbitrated quantum signature, chained CNOT, forgery, disavowal

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