Method for determining the best frequency band for 
eavesdropping the display image of a PC

doi:10.1016/S1005-8885(13)60075-8

中国邮电高校学报(英文) ›› 2013, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (4): 93-98.doi: 10.1016/S1005-8885(13)60075-8

• Artificial Intelligence • 上一篇下一篇

Method for determining the best frequency band for eavesdropping the display image of a PC

杜玉雷,张金玲,张南

School of Telecommunication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China

收稿日期:2012-08-21 修回日期:2013-04-02 出版日期:2013-08-31 发布日期:2013-08-30
通讯作者: 杜玉雷 E-mail:dylbupt@gmail.com
基金资助:
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61072136, 61171051).

Method for determining the best frequency band for eavesdropping the display image of a PC

School of Telecommunication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China

Received:2012-08-21 Revised:2013-04-02 Online:2013-08-31 Published:2013-08-30
Contact: Yu-Lei DU E-mail:dylbupt@gmail.com
Supported by:
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61072136, 61171051).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： The display image of the video display unit (VDU) can be reconstructed by receiving and analyzing the unexpected electromagnetic noise emanated from a personal computer system. This fact is one of the information leakage threats in information security. Therefore, in order to choose the best frequency range for receiving the electromagnetic compromising emanations form a PC display effectively and quickly, a method based on the correlation power analysis (CPA) and the common equipments is proposed. Firstly, the frequency spectrum of 10 MHz to 1 GHz is measured about 10 times respectively when the PC is displaying the white-black vertical strips image and black image. The frequency range which contains the display information can be obtained through the CPA. And then, the special image signal is searched around the dot frequency and harmonics. If the special signal disappears when displaying the total black image, it can be judged to be the real special signal. Finally, the best receiving frequency range can be chosen by comprehensive considering the results of CPA and the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the special image signal. In order to check the validity of the chosen frequency range, eavesdropping experiments are carried out. The results demonstrate that the selected frequency range can retrieve the higher quality image than other frequency bands.

关键词: electromagnetic secure, compromising emanations, CPA, eavesdropping, TEMPEST

Abstract: The display image of the video display unit (VDU) can be reconstructed by receiving and analyzing the unexpected electromagnetic noise emanated from a personal computer system. This fact is one of the information leakage threats in information security. Therefore, in order to choose the best frequency range for receiving the electromagnetic compromising emanations form a PC display effectively and quickly, a method based on the correlation power analysis (CPA) and the common equipments is proposed. Firstly, the frequency spectrum of 10 MHz to 1 GHz is measured about 10 times respectively when the PC is displaying the white-black vertical strips image and black image. The frequency range which contains the display information can be obtained through the CPA. And then, the special image signal is searched around the dot frequency and harmonics. If the special signal disappears when displaying the total black image, it can be judged to be the real special signal. Finally, the best receiving frequency range can be chosen by comprehensive considering the results of CPA and the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the special image signal. In order to check the validity of the chosen frequency range, eavesdropping experiments are carried out. The results demonstrate that the selected frequency range can retrieve the higher quality image than other frequency bands.

Key words: electromagnetic secure, compromising emanations, CPA, eavesdropping, TEMPEST

中图分类号:

TN971

DU Yu-lei, Lü Ying-hua, ZHANG Jin-ling, ZHANG Nan. Method for determining the best frequency band for eavesdropping the display image of a PC [J]. Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters), 2013, 20(4): 93-98.

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Method for determining the best frequency band for eavesdropping the display image of a PC

Method for determining the best frequency band for eavesdropping the display image of a PC

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